Policy Blog Entries by Kim Maynard

In an earlier post, I reviewed the Martha Graham copyright case and discussed how the outcome resonated in the dance field. In this post I’ll look at what choreographers are currently doing to cope with the result.

First a very quick recap: In 2002, a court found that Martha Graham did not necessarily own her own choreography. Instead, dance pieces that she created as an employee of the Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance were owned by the Center. This was relatively shocking news to the dance field, especially for choreographers who had generally operated under the assumption that they owned their own work.

In January 2007, the NYTimes published an article (registration required) exploring some of the options available to choreographers for preserving their work after death.

I’m sure many of you know about the now infamous (at least in the dance field) Martha Graham case. For those who don’t, or who need a refresher: Martha Graham, head of the Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance (“Center”), and considered by many to be the founder of modern dance, died in 1991. In her will, she left her estate to her close friend, Ron Protas. Towards the end of the decade, Mr. Protas, a non-dancer, claimed that he owned the copyrights to approximately seventy of Ms. Graham’s dances and threatened to prevent the Martha Graham Dance Company from performing those works.

Today, PK and the Public Interest Spectrum Coalition joined Google, Skype, Frontline Wireless, and other technology sector organizations in filing a letter to FCC Chairman Kevin Martin. This letter presents a united front among advocates for open access: public interest groups and high tech companies (in essence, everyone but incumbent broadband service providers) all agree that open access is an absolute must for the upcoming 700 MHz auction. You can read PISC’s previous filings here and here, more about open access here, and more about the 700 MHz auction here. In addition to highlighting the unity of open access advocates, the letter clarifies four principles of open access. Each and every one of these principles is essential if the auction is going to encourage the entrance of a third-pipe competitor to incumbent telephone and cable companies and promote innovation and competition in the wireless industry.

The four principles of successful open access are:

On Friday, the Ad Hoc Public Interest Spectrum Coalition (PISC), of which Public Knowledge is a member, made a detailed filing at the FCC addressing a number of the arguments made by incumbent telephone and cable companies against the rules that PISC has proposed for the upcoming 700 MHz spectrum auction. Not surprisingly, these companies are opposed to rules that would promote more broadband competition, including open access, anonymous bidding and limitations on incumbent participation. Also not surprisingly, their arguments against these pro-competitive rules are based on misconception and speculation.

Here are some of the arguments we addressed, and our responses:

The Public Knowledge blog is a great source for up-to-date information on key communications and copyright issues. But if you haven’t been reading it forever, well, it can be a little hard to jump in. Here, then, is a primer on some of the issues we’ve been working on, what’s new, and why you should care.

Reply comments were due last week for the FCC’s upcoming 700 MHz auction. As many of you know, this auction will make some of the most valuable spectrum available for use in providing wireless broadband services. Many businesses and other organizations have taken a great interest in what the final auction rules will be. PK is part of a group advocating for rules, such as bidding credits, spectrum caps, and incumbent exclusion, that will facilitate the entrance of a ‘third pipe’ competitor to compete with current broadband service providers. Read a summary of PK’s comments here. Incumbent broadband service providers, i.e. the big telephone and cable companies, are opposed to these eligibility conditions, arguing that they will stifle competition and reduce auction revenue. This argument, however, ignores history. Eligibility conditions in previous auctions did not stunt competition or lower final license prices. In fact, in the early PCS Narrowband and Broadband auctions, the eligibility conditions fostered equally, if not more, competitive bidding and produced increased auction revenue.