Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Applications of Comcast Corporation,
General Electric Company
and NBC Universal, Inc.
For Consent to Assign Licenses and
Transfer Control of Licenses
MB Docket No. 10-56
Petition to Enforce Merger Conditions
John Bergmayer
Jodie Griffin
Michael Weinberg
Public Knowledge
1818 N St. NW, Suite 410
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 861-0020
August 1,
2012
Table of Contents
Summary and Introduction 1
Argument 2
I. Comcast’s Treatment of its Xfinity Video App on Xbox and TiVo is Both
Discriminatory and Illegal 2
A. Comcast is Exempting its Own IP Delivered Video
Service From its Data Caps 2
B. Comcast’s Discrimination Against All Other OTT Video
Services Harms Innovation and Consumers 4
C. Comcast’s Actions Demand Enhanced Scrutiny 5
1. Leveraging Control of Internet Connections Has Long
Been a Concern of the Commission 7
2. Comcast’s Merger with NBC-Universal Elevated Those
Concerns 8
D. Comcast is in Violation of the Commission’s Merger
Conditions 9
II. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service 11
A. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service Because
It Is Only Available to Broadband Subscribers Using Broadband Devices 11
B. Title VI Services and Broadband Services are not
Mutually Exclusive 12
III. The Commission Must Establish Remedies that End Comcast’s Discrimination
and Prevent Future Harms from Comcast’s use of Data Caps 13
Conclusion 15
Summary and Introduction
Public Knowledge
requests that the Commission move to enforce the conditions it imposed upon
Comcast as part of Comcast’s merger with NBC-Universal. Comcast’s decision to exempt its online
video service from its own data caps is precisely the type of behavior
contemplated and barred by the Commission in the Merger Order. As such, the
Commission must move to end the behavior and prevent it
from being repeated in the future.
Although Comcast’s
decision may very well also be a violation of the Commission’s Open Internet
Order, it is critical for the Commission to first address this problem within
the context of the recent merger between Comcast and NBC-Universal. While the Open
Internet rules were intended as rules of general applicability for a multitude
of possibilities, the situation presented here is precisely that
envisioned by the Commission when it described the potential harms to
competition that could result from the merger. The Commission therefore has a
unique responsibility to address Comcast's conduct in the context of the merger
order, to avert the very harm the Commission accurately foresaw.
In evaluating the
merger, the Commission highlighted specific concerns associated with the
combination of the nation’s largest internet service provider and one of the
nation’s largest content companies.
These went above and beyond the more generalized problems that drove the
Open Internet Order. The behavior
highlighted in this petition is the realization of those specific concerns, and
therefore should be considered under the rules most directly related to them. Critically, no activity in this docket
would bar additional enforcement actions under the Open Internet Order.
Argument
I. Comcast’s Treatment of its Xfinity Video App on
Xbox and TiVo is Both Discriminatory and Illegal
Comcast’s
special treatment of its Xfinity video app realizes the fears the Commission expressed
regarding Comcast’s merger with NBC-Universal. As such, the Commission has an obligation to bring it to an
end.
A. Comcast is Exempting its Own IP Delivered Video
Service From its Data Caps
Consumers
have long been able to access internet video content on both their Xbox 360
game consoles and their TiVo DVRs.
Both platforms allow consumers to download and install apps for online
video services such as Netflix, YouTube, and Amazon Prime. These apps deliver video by way of the
consumer’s broadband connection and make it easy to watch internet-delivered
video on their television. In
fact, for many consumers this “over the top” (OTT) video experience is evolving
into a competitor to, and a replacement for, traditional MVPD pay television
service.[1] While the business models of these apps
vary and some require an additional subscription, they all require a broadband internet
connection in order to function.
Since
2008, Comcast has imposed a data cap of 250 GB per month on its residential
video customers.[2] As a general matter all OTT video, like
all data, has counted against a Comcast consumer’s data cap. If a consumer used more than the
allocated 250 GB per month of data for two consecutive months, that consumer
would be expelled from the network for a full year.[3] By Comcast’s own admission, the cap was
not imposed to address network congestion[4]
and was, until quite recently, below the 288 GB per month of data it projected
was needed to replace a cable television subscription with OTT offerings.[5]
Recently,
Comcast announced that it was raising its data cap to 300 GB per month.[6] Instead of being expelled from the
network a consumer who goes over the limit will be charged $10 for each
additional 50 GB.[7]
In
March of this year Comcast announced that it was bringing its own OTT video app
to the Xbox 360 and TiVo platforms.[8] This app delivers on-demand video over
IP and requires both an Xfinity broadband subscription and an Xfinity cable television subscription. The video is delivered through the
consumer’s home network to the Xbox 360 or TiVo device.
Comcast also
announced that this new Xfinity video app would not count against a consumer’s
monthly data cap. As a result, a
consumer trying to decide between a number of OTT video options on her Xbox 360
or TiVo knows that all of her choices count against her Comcast broadband data
cap – except the choice offered by Comcast.
B. Comcast’s Discrimination Against All Other OTT
Video Services Harms Innovation and Consumers
By
exempting its own OTT video service – and only its own OTT video service – from
data caps, Comcast is discriminating against every unaffiliated OTT video
service. This harms innovation and
harms consumers.
OTT
video has greatly expanded the amount and types of video content available to
consumers. Instead of squeezing
into the lineup of MVPDs, creators can connect to the public directly. This has fostered the creation of niche
programming and allowed new creators to build fan bases.
It
has also lead to the rise of innovative and competitive video
distributors. Netflix, Hulu, Dailymotion,
YouTube, Amazon, Revision 3 – all use different models to offer consumers
different types of video content over their broadband connection. These services introduce innovation
themselves and have begun to force MVPDs such as Comcast to innovate in
response.[9] Ultimately, this innovation results in
more competition, which benefits consumers.[10] Competition drives prices down while
driving quality up.
Discriminating
against non-affiliated OTT video undermines those trends. Comcast’s decision to exempt its own app
from the cap creates two kinds of OTT offerings: Comcast’s and the rest. The only reason that Comcast is able to
differentiate its OTT offering in this way is because it owns the network that
all OTT providers rely on to reach consumers. Comcast must not be allowed to leverage its control over
last mile connections to gain advantages in unrelated markets.
C. Comcast’s Actions Demand Enhanced Scrutiny
While
discrimination by any ISP raises concerns, Comcast’s unique history and
structure demand an enhanced level of scrutiny from the Commission.
Comcast
has a history of manipulating its network in a manner that directly contradicts
the principles of an open, competitive internet.[11] When confronted with accusations of
wrongdoing, Comcast has also obfuscated the true nature of its behavior.[12] In light of this, the Commission would
be wise to pay particular attention to concerns raised about Comcast’s behavior
and be wary of accepting technical justifications at face value.
In
addition to its history of problematic network management, Comcast’s current
market position demands a heightened level of scrutiny towards its behavior. As the Commission is well aware,
Comcast is a vertically integrated entertainment conglomerate. In addition to its internet access and
MVPD offerings, Comcast owns what was once NBC-Universal, thus expanding its
position in the content business.
This troika of interests gives Comcast an enhanced motivation and
ability to act contrary to the public interest. This level of control across industries can also make identifying
such behavior even more difficult.
As
the Commission has recently demonstrated by holding Comcast to its commitment
to offer standalone broadband,[13]
and as Project Concord has shown with its dispute with Comcast over programming
access,[14]
it takes some resolve to hold Comcast to the letter and spirit of its merger
commitments. But where, as here, Comcast is taking actions that not only
violate its merger conditions but threatens the growth of online video more
generally, that resolve becomes all the more necessary.
1. Leveraging Control of Internet Connections Has
Long Been a Concern of the Commission
The Commission
recognized the ability of broadband providers to act contrary to the public
interest well before the merger between Comcast and NBC-Universal. In 2004, then-Chairman Michael Powell
spoke about how Internet Freedom (including the freedom to access content)
served “as an insurance policy against the potential rise of abusive market
power by vertically integrated providers.”[15] The following year the Commission
adopted a policy statement that took a step towards formalizing those
protections.[16]
More recently, in
its Open Internet Order the Commission plainly stated that a “broadband
provider might use this power [to control the transmission of network traffic
over a broadband connection] to benefit its own or affiliated offerings at the
expense of unaffiliated offerings.”[17] Specifically, the Commission observed that
“[t]oday, broadband providers have incentives to interfere with the operations
of third-party Internet-based services that compete with the providers’ revenue-generating
telephony and/or pay television services.”[18]
Of
course, that is precisely what Comcast is doing today. Comcast is using its control over the
transmission of network traffic to disadvantage unaffiliated competitors to
Comcast’s pay television service and OTT video offering. Every video app on an Xbox 360 or TiVo
is a potential competitor (in whole or in part) to Comcast’s MVPD service. And every one of those unaffiliated
apps must contend with Comcast’s data cap. Only Comcast’s own video app is exempted from the data cap.
2. Comcast’s Merger with NBC-Universal Elevated
Those Concerns
These
general concerns were made specific during Comcast’s merger with NBC-Universal. Now, in addition to the opportunity to
leverage its control over network connections to advantage its MVPD service, a merged
Comcast/NBC-Universal has an opportunity to leverage its control over network
connections and its expanded control
over content to advantage its MVPD service.
This
ability is not merely theoretical.
After an investigation, the Commission found this threat to be real:
“[the merged entity] would also have the incentive and ability to hinder the
development of rival online video offerings and inhibit potential competition
from emerging online video distributors that could challenge Comcast’s cable
television business.”[19]
Furthermore, the Commission
determined that the merger would “increase Comcast’s incentive to discriminate
against unaffiliated content and distributors in its exercise of control over
consumers’ broadband connections.”[20]
The
Commission was not alone in concluding that the merger increased the likelihood
that Comcast would manipulate its network contrary to the public interest. During its own parallel investigation
into the merger, the Department of Justice (DOJ) recognized that internet-delivered
video – precisely the type of service that would use apps on an Xbox 360 or TiVo
to reach consumers – was “likely the best hope for additional video programming
distribution competition in Comcast’s cable franchise area.”[21] Comcast’s internal documents “consistently
portray[ed] the emergence of OVDs as a significant threat.”[22] These new entrants would give consumers
more options and also force Comcast to improve its own services.[23]
The
DOJ noted that Comcast’s position as both internet access provider and MVPD created
a motive to act against the public interest: “[b]ecause Comcast is the
country’s largest ISP, an inherent conflict exists between Comcast’s provision
of broadband service to its customers, who may use this service to view
programming provided by [online video distributors], and its desire to continue
to sell them MVPD service.”[24] As of today, Comcast has resolved that
conflict by using its control of internet access to undermine non-affiliated online
video content and distributors.
D. Comcast is in Violation of the Commission’s
Merger Conditions
Comcast’s
decision to discriminate against all nonaffiliated video apps violates
Condition G.1.a. set forth by the Commission in its Merger Order:
“Neither Comcast nor C-NBCU shall
engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, the purpose or effect of which is to hinder significantly or prevent
any MVPD or OVD from providing Video Programming online to subscribers or
customers.”
This
condition directly addresses unfair practices that significantly hinder any OVD
from providing content to subscribers or customers. That is precisely what is happening with the Xfinity
app.
Comcast’s practice
of counting all unaffiliated, but not its own, content against a customer’s
data cap significantly hinders an OVD from providing content to customers. A customer could watch Xfinity-delivered
online video 24 hours a day for an entire month and not run into a
problem. With any other online
video service, a customer could hit her cap before the end of the first week.[25] While this may be an extreme example,
it vividly illustrates how Comcast’s behavior significantly hinders the ability
of any company that is not Comcast to reach consumers.[26] Caps transform video from an all you
can eat experience to one that must be carefully monitored and limited.
Crucially,
the Condition does not require that Comcast acts with malicious intent – or any
intent at all – to be in violation.
Therefore, there is no need to make an explicit finding regarding
Comcast’s specific motivation for this policy. As long as the unfair act has the effect of hindering
distribution, that act violates the condition.
There
can be no question that exempting Xfinity video is unfair. In fact, it represents precisely the type
of behavior that the Commission has been worrying about for almost a decade. The only reason that Xfinity video is
exempted from the data cap is that it is distributed by the same company
providing the broadband internet access service used to deliver it. Even if the app were to use a slightly
different delivery path for content than other online video distributors, that
other path is only possible because Comcast also owns the delivery
infrastructure.
The
combination of the Xfinity app and the data cap exemption is precisely the type
of unfair practices that Comcast promised not to engage in as a condition of
its merger.
II. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service
If Comcast can
simply label a broadband Internet service a “cable” service and thus exempt it
from oversight, as it has tried to do here, then all of the Commission's
attempts to protect the Open Internet, promote competitive online video
service, and enhance consumer choice will be for nothing.
By Comcast's
reasoning any service it offers, provided it is made available only to cable TV
subscribers, is part of its cable offering, governed only by Title VI of the
Communications Act.[27] This cannot be the case.
A. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service
Because It Is Only Available to Broadband Subscribers Using Broadband Devices
The Xfinity app is
plainly a broadband service: it is
delivered over the same broadband connection as other internet services to internet-connected
devices, and consists of streaming video using the Internet Protocol. That said, behind-the-scenes
engineering and billing details should have no bearing on the regulatory
treatment of a service. Because
the Xfinity app appears to consumers to be a broadband video service, it is
one.
Comcast argues that
the Xfinity app is only part of its “cable” offering, governed only by Title VI
of the Communications Act, and not subject to any Internet openness
protections.[28] This argument is undermined by the fact
that Comcast requires consumers to subscribe to Comcast internet service in
order to access it, using a device which is designed to access internet
content.
From a viewer's
perspective there is no real difference between the Xfinity app and a competing
internet video app – both are simply apps that the consumer launches that
stream video over a broadband connection.
The fact that Comcast locates its servers on its own network or engages
in discriminatory billing practices does not change the basic character of its
service.
B. Title VI Services and Broadband Services are not
Mutually Exclusive
Title VI is a type
of service, and broadband is a type of delivery method. The two are not
mutually exclusive, and there is no reason why a service cannot both be a Title
VI service and a broadband service subject to the Commission’s Open Internet
rules, Comcast’s merger commitments, and related protections. Title VI is a technology-neutral
section that governs multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs),
regardless of what kind of delivery method they use. MVPDs provide a video service by various means. Analog cable systems are MVPDs. So are digital cable systems, IPTV
systems like those offered by AT&T, Verizon’s FiOS television service, and
direct broadcast satellite (DBS) systems like DirecTV and Dish. Indeed, as
Public Knowledge has argued, there is no reason an “MVPD” service cannot be
offered purely “over the top.”[29]
By contrast, a “broadband”
service is simply a service offered via broadband delivery. A broadband service might fall into any
regulatory category, such as Title II or Title VI. An MVPD service can easily
be offered via broadband delivery, and an MVPD service offered via broadband is
not somehow immune from any of the open Internet protections that apply to
broadband services generally.
III. The Commission Must Establish Remedies that End
Comcast’s Discrimination and Prevent Future Harms from Comcast’s use of Data
Caps
The Commission
must order Comcast to stop exempting only its own Xfinity video app from its
data caps. Going forward, the Commission should prohibit Comcast from
implementing discriminatory data caps again.
The Commission
could fashion this relief in several ways, ranging from prohibiting Comcast
from using unreasonably low data caps, to requiring Comcast to subject its own
services to the data caps it uses for similarly-situated services, to requiring
Comcast to let its customers choose which services will be exempt from its data
caps.
When crafting
remedies to address and prevent the competitive harms of Comcast’s
discriminatory data cap policy, the Commission should consider a set of factors
to determine whether Comcast’s data caps policy or its implementation
illegitimately harm consumers and competitors. The Commission need not necessarily
take any one factor as dispositive in a given case, although some factors may
weigh more heavily than others.
First, data cap
policies that affect one service or set of services but not others should be a
red flag to the Commission. The Commission should then look to whether the
policy has a discriminatory effect against services or companies that compete
against any of Comcast’s services. This could apply if Comcast’s data cap
policy advantages affiliated companies simply by virtue of their affiliation to
Comcast, or if Comcast and other internet service providers mutually advantage
their respective services to the detriment of services unaffiliated with any
internet service provider. The
Commission should also be wary of data cap policies that permit companies to
pay Comcast to exempt themselves from a data cap, since those policies could
have a discriminatory effect by disproportionately impacting services that are
not affiliated with Comcast.
Second, the
Commission should consider whether Comcast’s data cap is set at such a low
level that a large percentage of customers are likely to hit that cap. This
fact bears on the likelihood that Comcast’s data caps are only serving to
remove incentives for Comcast to invest in its own network and to push
customers away from services that directly or indirectly compete with Comcast’s
services for customers’ time and resources (for example, by discouraging online
video games in favor of Comcast’s paid TV services).
Third, the
Commission should consider the legitimate justifications—or lack thereof—for
Comcast’s data caps. Here, the Commission should investigate the actual impact
of Comcast’s data caps on network congestion, how often customers hit their
caps, and how often customers would hit their caps if Comcast's other services
were also subject to the data cap.
Conclusion
Comcast is
currently in violation of the Commission’s merger order and is actively
undermining video competitors. The
Commission should therefore order Comcast to immediately stop exempting only
its Xfinity service from the data caps it imposes on its customers’ activity.
Going forward, the Commission should prohibit Comcast from using unnecessarily
discriminatory data caps, as determined by the factors explained above.
Respectfully Submitted,
Public Knowledge
_______/s/_______
Michael Weinberg
Public Knowledge
1818 N St. NW
Suite 410
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 861-0020
mweinberg@publicknowledge.org
August 1, 2012
[1] Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket
No. 09-191; Broadband Industry Practices,
WC Docket No. 07-52, “Report and Order,” FCC 10-201 (Dec. 23, 1020) at 22 (Open
Internet Order); Complaint of United States, et al., United States v.
Comcast Corp., (D.C. Cir. 2011) at 5 (DOJ Complaint).
[2] Jacqui
Cheng, It’s Official: Comcast Starts
250GB bandwidth caps October 1, ars technica, Aug. 8, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/08/its-official-comcast-starts-250gb-bandwidth-caps-october-1.ars.
[3] Letter from
Public Knowledge and New America Foundation’s Open Technology Initiative to
Sharon Gillett, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau, FCC (May 6, 2011) available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/letter-to-FCC-on-ATT-Data-Caps.
[4] Letter of
Comcast Corporation, Formal Complaint of
Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, File No. EB-08-IH-1518; Broadband Industry Practices; Petition of
Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading and Internet
Application Violates the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet and
Exception for “Reasonable Network Management,” WC Docket No. 07-52, at p.
1, fn. 3, Sept. 19, 2008 (“Comcast Filing”).
[5] Notably, the
estimate of 288 GB was based on a confidential mix of standard and high
definition programming in 2010. It
therefore may significantly underestimate current needs, which include a higher
percentage of high definition video.
For example, streaming only HD video for the number of hours per month
assumed by Comcast at the bitrate assumed by Comcast would require 648 GB. Mark Israel and Michael L. Katz, “The Comcast/NBCU Transaction
and Online Video Distribution,” Submitted by Comcast Corporation, MB Docket No.
10-56 (May 4 2010) at 33,
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020448236;
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020448237.
[6] Cathy
Avgiris, Comcast to Replace Usage Cap
With Improved Data Usage Management Approaches, ComcastVoices, May 17,
2012, http://blog.comcast.com/2012/05/comcast-to-replace-usage-cap-with-improved-data-usage-management-approaches.html.
[7] Id.
[8] Major
Nelson, Comcast XFINITY TV, HBO GO and
MLB.TV now available on Xbox LIVE, Mar. 27, 2012, http://majornelson.com/2012/03/27/comcast-xfinity-tv-hbo-go-mlb-tv-now-available-on-xbox-live/;
For the first time ever XFINITY On Demand
from Comcast now available to San Francisco Bay Area TiVo and Comcast
Customers!, TiVo Blog, Apr. 9, 2012, http://blog.tivo.com/2012/04/xfinity-on-demand-from-comcast-tivo-premiere/.
[9] DOJ
Complaint at 21.
[10] See, e.g.
DOJ Complaint at 14.
[11] See, e.g.
Broadband Industry Practices, Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory
Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s Internet
Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for “Reasonable Network
Management,” Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC Docket 07-52, ¶ 32 (Aug. 20,
2008), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.pdf.
[12] See id. at 6-9.
[13] See Stacey Higginbotham, Comcast pays $800,000 to U.S. for hiding
stand-alone broadband, GigaOM, June 27, 2012, http://gigaom.com/2012/06/27/comcast-pays-800000-to-u-s-for-hiding-stand-alone-broadband/.
[14] See Ira Teinowitz, Comcast faces NBC merger complaint, TheDeal, March 8, 2012, http://www.thedeal.com/content/regulatory/comcast-faces-nbc-merger-complaint.php.
[15] Michael K.
Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Remarks at the Voice of the Net Conference (Oct. 19, 2004), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-253325A1.pdf.
[16] Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access
to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, CC Docket No. 02-33 et al., Policy Statement, (Sep. 23,
2005).
[17] Open
Internet Order at 21.
[18] Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
[19] Applications of Comcast Corporation, General
Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc. For Consent to Assign Licenses and
Transfer Control of Licensees, MB Docket No 10-56, Memorandum Opinion and
Order (Jan. 20, 2011) at 3 (FCC Merger Order).
[20] Id. at 93.
[21] DOJ
Complaint at 5.
[22] DOJ
Complaint at 14.
[23] See DOJ
Complaint 14-15.
[24] Competitive
Impact Statement of United States, et al.,
United States v. Comcast Corp., (D.C.
Cir. 2011) at 11.
[25] For
example, a consumer streaming Netflix at its high quality HD rate (2.3 GB per
hour) would hit the 300 GB cap approximately 5.5 days into the month. A consumer streaming HD video at
Comcast’s assumed rate of 6,000 Kbps (2.7 GB per hour) would hit the 300 GB cap
approximately one day sooner.
[26] Comcast’s
2010 household usage estimate was 8 hours of television per day. At 2.3 GB per hour, a full OTT
replacement for high definition television would weigh in at 552 GB per month. At 2.7 GB per hour, a full OTT
replacement for high definition television would weigh in at 648 GB per month.
[27] Of course,
in the final analysis whether or not the Xfinity app on the Xbox is a
"Title VI" service does not matter. A service can be both
a broadband service and a Title VI
service. And to the extent that the Xfinity app is a Title VI service, it is subject to various Commission rules
forbidding discrimination against rival video services. See
47 U.S.C. § 548.
[28] http://xbox.comcast.net/faqs.html
[29] See Comments of Public Knowledge, Interpretation of the Terms “Multichannel
Video Programming Distributor” and “Channel” as Raised in Pending Program
Access Proceeding, MB Docket No. 12-83 (filed May 14, 2012), available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/interpretation-mvpd.
stdClass Object
(
[nid] => 7044
[type] => documentfile
[language] =>
[uid] => 3459
[status] => 1
[created] => 1343832056
[changed] => 1343832856
[comment] => 0
[promote] => 0
[moderate] => 0
[sticky] => 0
[tnid] => 0
[translate] => 0
[vid] => 7106
[revision_uid] => 3459
[title] => Comcast Xbox Data Caps Petition
[body] =>
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Applications of Comcast Corporation,
General Electric Company
and NBC Universal, Inc.
For Consent to Assign Licenses and
Transfer Control of Licenses
MB Docket No. 10-56
Petition to Enforce Merger Conditions
John Bergmayer
Jodie Griffin
Michael Weinberg
Public Knowledge
1818 N St. NW, Suite 410
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 861-0020
August 1,
2012
Table of Contents
Summary and Introduction 1
Argument 2
I. Comcast’s Treatment of its Xfinity Video App on Xbox and TiVo is Both
Discriminatory and Illegal 2
A. Comcast is Exempting its Own IP Delivered Video
Service From its Data Caps 2
B. Comcast’s Discrimination Against All Other OTT Video
Services Harms Innovation and Consumers 4
C. Comcast’s Actions Demand Enhanced Scrutiny 5
1. Leveraging Control of Internet Connections Has Long
Been a Concern of the Commission 7
2. Comcast’s Merger with NBC-Universal Elevated Those
Concerns 8
D. Comcast is in Violation of the Commission’s Merger
Conditions 9
II. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service 11
A. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service Because
It Is Only Available to Broadband Subscribers Using Broadband Devices 11
B. Title VI Services and Broadband Services are not
Mutually Exclusive 12
III. The Commission Must Establish Remedies that End Comcast’s Discrimination
and Prevent Future Harms from Comcast’s use of Data Caps 13
Conclusion 15
Summary and Introduction
Public Knowledge
requests that the Commission move to enforce the conditions it imposed upon
Comcast as part of Comcast’s merger with NBC-Universal. Comcast’s decision to exempt its online
video service from its own data caps is precisely the type of behavior
contemplated and barred by the Commission in the Merger Order. As such, the
Commission must move to end the behavior and prevent it
from being repeated in the future.
Although Comcast’s
decision may very well also be a violation of the Commission’s Open Internet
Order, it is critical for the Commission to first address this problem within
the context of the recent merger between Comcast and NBC-Universal. While the Open
Internet rules were intended as rules of general applicability for a multitude
of possibilities, the situation presented here is precisely that
envisioned by the Commission when it described the potential harms to
competition that could result from the merger. The Commission therefore has a
unique responsibility to address Comcast's conduct in the context of the merger
order, to avert the very harm the Commission accurately foresaw.
In evaluating the
merger, the Commission highlighted specific concerns associated with the
combination of the nation’s largest internet service provider and one of the
nation’s largest content companies.
These went above and beyond the more generalized problems that drove the
Open Internet Order. The behavior
highlighted in this petition is the realization of those specific concerns, and
therefore should be considered under the rules most directly related to them. Critically, no activity in this docket
would bar additional enforcement actions under the Open Internet Order.
Argument
I. Comcast’s Treatment of its Xfinity Video App on
Xbox and TiVo is Both Discriminatory and Illegal
Comcast’s
special treatment of its Xfinity video app realizes the fears the Commission expressed
regarding Comcast’s merger with NBC-Universal. As such, the Commission has an obligation to bring it to an
end.
A. Comcast is Exempting its Own IP Delivered Video
Service From its Data Caps
Consumers
have long been able to access internet video content on both their Xbox 360
game consoles and their TiVo DVRs.
Both platforms allow consumers to download and install apps for online
video services such as Netflix, YouTube, and Amazon Prime. These apps deliver video by way of the
consumer’s broadband connection and make it easy to watch internet-delivered
video on their television. In
fact, for many consumers this “over the top” (OTT) video experience is evolving
into a competitor to, and a replacement for, traditional MVPD pay television
service.[1] While the business models of these apps
vary and some require an additional subscription, they all require a broadband internet
connection in order to function.
Since
2008, Comcast has imposed a data cap of 250 GB per month on its residential
video customers.[2] As a general matter all OTT video, like
all data, has counted against a Comcast consumer’s data cap. If a consumer used more than the
allocated 250 GB per month of data for two consecutive months, that consumer
would be expelled from the network for a full year.[3] By Comcast’s own admission, the cap was
not imposed to address network congestion[4]
and was, until quite recently, below the 288 GB per month of data it projected
was needed to replace a cable television subscription with OTT offerings.[5]
Recently,
Comcast announced that it was raising its data cap to 300 GB per month.[6] Instead of being expelled from the
network a consumer who goes over the limit will be charged $10 for each
additional 50 GB.[7]
In
March of this year Comcast announced that it was bringing its own OTT video app
to the Xbox 360 and TiVo platforms.[8] This app delivers on-demand video over
IP and requires both an Xfinity broadband subscription and an Xfinity cable television subscription. The video is delivered through the
consumer’s home network to the Xbox 360 or TiVo device.
Comcast also
announced that this new Xfinity video app would not count against a consumer’s
monthly data cap. As a result, a
consumer trying to decide between a number of OTT video options on her Xbox 360
or TiVo knows that all of her choices count against her Comcast broadband data
cap – except the choice offered by Comcast.
B. Comcast’s Discrimination Against All Other OTT
Video Services Harms Innovation and Consumers
By
exempting its own OTT video service – and only its own OTT video service – from
data caps, Comcast is discriminating against every unaffiliated OTT video
service. This harms innovation and
harms consumers.
OTT
video has greatly expanded the amount and types of video content available to
consumers. Instead of squeezing
into the lineup of MVPDs, creators can connect to the public directly. This has fostered the creation of niche
programming and allowed new creators to build fan bases.
It
has also lead to the rise of innovative and competitive video
distributors. Netflix, Hulu, Dailymotion,
YouTube, Amazon, Revision 3 – all use different models to offer consumers
different types of video content over their broadband connection. These services introduce innovation
themselves and have begun to force MVPDs such as Comcast to innovate in
response.[9] Ultimately, this innovation results in
more competition, which benefits consumers.[10] Competition drives prices down while
driving quality up.
Discriminating
against non-affiliated OTT video undermines those trends. Comcast’s decision to exempt its own app
from the cap creates two kinds of OTT offerings: Comcast’s and the rest. The only reason that Comcast is able to
differentiate its OTT offering in this way is because it owns the network that
all OTT providers rely on to reach consumers. Comcast must not be allowed to leverage its control over
last mile connections to gain advantages in unrelated markets.
C. Comcast’s Actions Demand Enhanced Scrutiny
While
discrimination by any ISP raises concerns, Comcast’s unique history and
structure demand an enhanced level of scrutiny from the Commission.
Comcast
has a history of manipulating its network in a manner that directly contradicts
the principles of an open, competitive internet.[11] When confronted with accusations of
wrongdoing, Comcast has also obfuscated the true nature of its behavior.[12] In light of this, the Commission would
be wise to pay particular attention to concerns raised about Comcast’s behavior
and be wary of accepting technical justifications at face value.
In
addition to its history of problematic network management, Comcast’s current
market position demands a heightened level of scrutiny towards its behavior. As the Commission is well aware,
Comcast is a vertically integrated entertainment conglomerate. In addition to its internet access and
MVPD offerings, Comcast owns what was once NBC-Universal, thus expanding its
position in the content business.
This troika of interests gives Comcast an enhanced motivation and
ability to act contrary to the public interest. This level of control across industries can also make identifying
such behavior even more difficult.
As
the Commission has recently demonstrated by holding Comcast to its commitment
to offer standalone broadband,[13]
and as Project Concord has shown with its dispute with Comcast over programming
access,[14]
it takes some resolve to hold Comcast to the letter and spirit of its merger
commitments. But where, as here, Comcast is taking actions that not only
violate its merger conditions but threatens the growth of online video more
generally, that resolve becomes all the more necessary.
1. Leveraging Control of Internet Connections Has
Long Been a Concern of the Commission
The Commission
recognized the ability of broadband providers to act contrary to the public
interest well before the merger between Comcast and NBC-Universal. In 2004, then-Chairman Michael Powell
spoke about how Internet Freedom (including the freedom to access content)
served “as an insurance policy against the potential rise of abusive market
power by vertically integrated providers.”[15] The following year the Commission
adopted a policy statement that took a step towards formalizing those
protections.[16]
More recently, in
its Open Internet Order the Commission plainly stated that a “broadband
provider might use this power [to control the transmission of network traffic
over a broadband connection] to benefit its own or affiliated offerings at the
expense of unaffiliated offerings.”[17] Specifically, the Commission observed that
“[t]oday, broadband providers have incentives to interfere with the operations
of third-party Internet-based services that compete with the providers’ revenue-generating
telephony and/or pay television services.”[18]
Of
course, that is precisely what Comcast is doing today. Comcast is using its control over the
transmission of network traffic to disadvantage unaffiliated competitors to
Comcast’s pay television service and OTT video offering. Every video app on an Xbox 360 or TiVo
is a potential competitor (in whole or in part) to Comcast’s MVPD service. And every one of those unaffiliated
apps must contend with Comcast’s data cap. Only Comcast’s own video app is exempted from the data cap.
2. Comcast’s Merger with NBC-Universal Elevated
Those Concerns
These
general concerns were made specific during Comcast’s merger with NBC-Universal. Now, in addition to the opportunity to
leverage its control over network connections to advantage its MVPD service, a merged
Comcast/NBC-Universal has an opportunity to leverage its control over network
connections and its expanded control
over content to advantage its MVPD service.
This
ability is not merely theoretical.
After an investigation, the Commission found this threat to be real:
“[the merged entity] would also have the incentive and ability to hinder the
development of rival online video offerings and inhibit potential competition
from emerging online video distributors that could challenge Comcast’s cable
television business.”[19]
Furthermore, the Commission
determined that the merger would “increase Comcast’s incentive to discriminate
against unaffiliated content and distributors in its exercise of control over
consumers’ broadband connections.”[20]
The
Commission was not alone in concluding that the merger increased the likelihood
that Comcast would manipulate its network contrary to the public interest. During its own parallel investigation
into the merger, the Department of Justice (DOJ) recognized that internet-delivered
video – precisely the type of service that would use apps on an Xbox 360 or TiVo
to reach consumers – was “likely the best hope for additional video programming
distribution competition in Comcast’s cable franchise area.”[21] Comcast’s internal documents “consistently
portray[ed] the emergence of OVDs as a significant threat.”[22] These new entrants would give consumers
more options and also force Comcast to improve its own services.[23]
The
DOJ noted that Comcast’s position as both internet access provider and MVPD created
a motive to act against the public interest: “[b]ecause Comcast is the
country’s largest ISP, an inherent conflict exists between Comcast’s provision
of broadband service to its customers, who may use this service to view
programming provided by [online video distributors], and its desire to continue
to sell them MVPD service.”[24] As of today, Comcast has resolved that
conflict by using its control of internet access to undermine non-affiliated online
video content and distributors.
D. Comcast is in Violation of the Commission’s
Merger Conditions
Comcast’s
decision to discriminate against all nonaffiliated video apps violates
Condition G.1.a. set forth by the Commission in its Merger Order:
“Neither Comcast nor C-NBCU shall
engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, the purpose or effect of which is to hinder significantly or prevent
any MVPD or OVD from providing Video Programming online to subscribers or
customers.”
This
condition directly addresses unfair practices that significantly hinder any OVD
from providing content to subscribers or customers. That is precisely what is happening with the Xfinity
app.
Comcast’s practice
of counting all unaffiliated, but not its own, content against a customer’s
data cap significantly hinders an OVD from providing content to customers. A customer could watch Xfinity-delivered
online video 24 hours a day for an entire month and not run into a
problem. With any other online
video service, a customer could hit her cap before the end of the first week.[25] While this may be an extreme example,
it vividly illustrates how Comcast’s behavior significantly hinders the ability
of any company that is not Comcast to reach consumers.[26] Caps transform video from an all you
can eat experience to one that must be carefully monitored and limited.
Crucially,
the Condition does not require that Comcast acts with malicious intent – or any
intent at all – to be in violation.
Therefore, there is no need to make an explicit finding regarding
Comcast’s specific motivation for this policy. As long as the unfair act has the effect of hindering
distribution, that act violates the condition.
There
can be no question that exempting Xfinity video is unfair. In fact, it represents precisely the type
of behavior that the Commission has been worrying about for almost a decade. The only reason that Xfinity video is
exempted from the data cap is that it is distributed by the same company
providing the broadband internet access service used to deliver it. Even if the app were to use a slightly
different delivery path for content than other online video distributors, that
other path is only possible because Comcast also owns the delivery
infrastructure.
The
combination of the Xfinity app and the data cap exemption is precisely the type
of unfair practices that Comcast promised not to engage in as a condition of
its merger.
II. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service
If Comcast can
simply label a broadband Internet service a “cable” service and thus exempt it
from oversight, as it has tried to do here, then all of the Commission's
attempts to protect the Open Internet, promote competitive online video
service, and enhance consumer choice will be for nothing.
By Comcast's
reasoning any service it offers, provided it is made available only to cable TV
subscribers, is part of its cable offering, governed only by Title VI of the
Communications Act.[27] This cannot be the case.
A. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service
Because It Is Only Available to Broadband Subscribers Using Broadband Devices
The Xfinity app is
plainly a broadband service: it is
delivered over the same broadband connection as other internet services to internet-connected
devices, and consists of streaming video using the Internet Protocol. That said, behind-the-scenes
engineering and billing details should have no bearing on the regulatory
treatment of a service. Because
the Xfinity app appears to consumers to be a broadband video service, it is
one.
Comcast argues that
the Xfinity app is only part of its “cable” offering, governed only by Title VI
of the Communications Act, and not subject to any Internet openness
protections.[28] This argument is undermined by the fact
that Comcast requires consumers to subscribe to Comcast internet service in
order to access it, using a device which is designed to access internet
content.
From a viewer's
perspective there is no real difference between the Xfinity app and a competing
internet video app – both are simply apps that the consumer launches that
stream video over a broadband connection.
The fact that Comcast locates its servers on its own network or engages
in discriminatory billing practices does not change the basic character of its
service.
B. Title VI Services and Broadband Services are not
Mutually Exclusive
Title VI is a type
of service, and broadband is a type of delivery method. The two are not
mutually exclusive, and there is no reason why a service cannot both be a Title
VI service and a broadband service subject to the Commission’s Open Internet
rules, Comcast’s merger commitments, and related protections. Title VI is a technology-neutral
section that governs multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs),
regardless of what kind of delivery method they use. MVPDs provide a video service by various means. Analog cable systems are MVPDs. So are digital cable systems, IPTV
systems like those offered by AT&T, Verizon’s FiOS television service, and
direct broadcast satellite (DBS) systems like DirecTV and Dish. Indeed, as
Public Knowledge has argued, there is no reason an “MVPD” service cannot be
offered purely “over the top.”[29]
By contrast, a “broadband”
service is simply a service offered via broadband delivery. A broadband service might fall into any
regulatory category, such as Title II or Title VI. An MVPD service can easily
be offered via broadband delivery, and an MVPD service offered via broadband is
not somehow immune from any of the open Internet protections that apply to
broadband services generally.
III. The Commission Must Establish Remedies that End
Comcast’s Discrimination and Prevent Future Harms from Comcast’s use of Data
Caps
The Commission
must order Comcast to stop exempting only its own Xfinity video app from its
data caps. Going forward, the Commission should prohibit Comcast from
implementing discriminatory data caps again.
The Commission
could fashion this relief in several ways, ranging from prohibiting Comcast
from using unreasonably low data caps, to requiring Comcast to subject its own
services to the data caps it uses for similarly-situated services, to requiring
Comcast to let its customers choose which services will be exempt from its data
caps.
When crafting
remedies to address and prevent the competitive harms of Comcast’s
discriminatory data cap policy, the Commission should consider a set of factors
to determine whether Comcast’s data caps policy or its implementation
illegitimately harm consumers and competitors. The Commission need not necessarily
take any one factor as dispositive in a given case, although some factors may
weigh more heavily than others.
First, data cap
policies that affect one service or set of services but not others should be a
red flag to the Commission. The Commission should then look to whether the
policy has a discriminatory effect against services or companies that compete
against any of Comcast’s services. This could apply if Comcast’s data cap
policy advantages affiliated companies simply by virtue of their affiliation to
Comcast, or if Comcast and other internet service providers mutually advantage
their respective services to the detriment of services unaffiliated with any
internet service provider. The
Commission should also be wary of data cap policies that permit companies to
pay Comcast to exempt themselves from a data cap, since those policies could
have a discriminatory effect by disproportionately impacting services that are
not affiliated with Comcast.
Second, the
Commission should consider whether Comcast’s data cap is set at such a low
level that a large percentage of customers are likely to hit that cap. This
fact bears on the likelihood that Comcast’s data caps are only serving to
remove incentives for Comcast to invest in its own network and to push
customers away from services that directly or indirectly compete with Comcast’s
services for customers’ time and resources (for example, by discouraging online
video games in favor of Comcast’s paid TV services).
Third, the
Commission should consider the legitimate justifications—or lack thereof—for
Comcast’s data caps. Here, the Commission should investigate the actual impact
of Comcast’s data caps on network congestion, how often customers hit their
caps, and how often customers would hit their caps if Comcast's other services
were also subject to the data cap.
Conclusion
Comcast is
currently in violation of the Commission’s merger order and is actively
undermining video competitors. The
Commission should therefore order Comcast to immediately stop exempting only
its Xfinity service from the data caps it imposes on its customers’ activity.
Going forward, the Commission should prohibit Comcast from using unnecessarily
discriminatory data caps, as determined by the factors explained above.
Respectfully Submitted,
Public Knowledge
_______/s/_______
Michael Weinberg
Public Knowledge
1818 N St. NW
Suite 410
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 861-0020
mweinberg@publicknowledge.org
August 1, 2012
[1] Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket
No. 09-191; Broadband Industry Practices,
WC Docket No. 07-52, “Report and Order,” FCC 10-201 (Dec. 23, 1020) at 22 (Open
Internet Order); Complaint of United States, et al., United States v.
Comcast Corp., (D.C. Cir. 2011) at 5 (DOJ Complaint).
[2] Jacqui
Cheng, It’s Official: Comcast Starts
250GB bandwidth caps October 1, ars technica, Aug. 8, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/08/its-official-comcast-starts-250gb-bandwidth-caps-october-1.ars.
[3] Letter from
Public Knowledge and New America Foundation’s Open Technology Initiative to
Sharon Gillett, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau, FCC (May 6, 2011) available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/letter-to-FCC-on-ATT-Data-Caps.
[4] Letter of
Comcast Corporation, Formal Complaint of
Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, File No. EB-08-IH-1518; Broadband Industry Practices; Petition of
Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading and Internet
Application Violates the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet and
Exception for “Reasonable Network Management,” WC Docket No. 07-52, at p.
1, fn. 3, Sept. 19, 2008 (“Comcast Filing”).
[5] Notably, the
estimate of 288 GB was based on a confidential mix of standard and high
definition programming in 2010. It
therefore may significantly underestimate current needs, which include a higher
percentage of high definition video.
For example, streaming only HD video for the number of hours per month
assumed by Comcast at the bitrate assumed by Comcast would require 648 GB. Mark Israel and Michael L. Katz, “The Comcast/NBCU Transaction
and Online Video Distribution,” Submitted by Comcast Corporation, MB Docket No.
10-56 (May 4 2010) at 33,
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020448236;
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020448237.
[6] Cathy
Avgiris, Comcast to Replace Usage Cap
With Improved Data Usage Management Approaches, ComcastVoices, May 17,
2012, http://blog.comcast.com/2012/05/comcast-to-replace-usage-cap-with-improved-data-usage-management-approaches.html.
[7] Id.
[8] Major
Nelson, Comcast XFINITY TV, HBO GO and
MLB.TV now available on Xbox LIVE, Mar. 27, 2012, http://majornelson.com/2012/03/27/comcast-xfinity-tv-hbo-go-mlb-tv-now-available-on-xbox-live/;
For the first time ever XFINITY On Demand
from Comcast now available to San Francisco Bay Area TiVo and Comcast
Customers!, TiVo Blog, Apr. 9, 2012, http://blog.tivo.com/2012/04/xfinity-on-demand-from-comcast-tivo-premiere/.
[9] DOJ
Complaint at 21.
[10] See, e.g.
DOJ Complaint at 14.
[11] See, e.g.
Broadband Industry Practices, Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory
Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s Internet
Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for “Reasonable Network
Management,” Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC Docket 07-52, ¶ 32 (Aug. 20,
2008), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.pdf.
[12] See id. at 6-9.
[13] See Stacey Higginbotham, Comcast pays $800,000 to U.S. for hiding
stand-alone broadband, GigaOM, June 27, 2012, http://gigaom.com/2012/06/27/comcast-pays-800000-to-u-s-for-hiding-stand-alone-broadband/.
[14] See Ira Teinowitz, Comcast faces NBC merger complaint, TheDeal, March 8, 2012, http://www.thedeal.com/content/regulatory/comcast-faces-nbc-merger-complaint.php.
[15] Michael K.
Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Remarks at the Voice of the Net Conference (Oct. 19, 2004), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-253325A1.pdf.
[16] Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access
to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, CC Docket No. 02-33 et al., Policy Statement, (Sep. 23,
2005).
[17] Open
Internet Order at 21.
[18] Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
[19] Applications of Comcast Corporation, General
Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc. For Consent to Assign Licenses and
Transfer Control of Licensees, MB Docket No 10-56, Memorandum Opinion and
Order (Jan. 20, 2011) at 3 (FCC Merger Order).
[20] Id. at 93.
[21] DOJ
Complaint at 5.
[22] DOJ
Complaint at 14.
[23] See DOJ
Complaint 14-15.
[24] Competitive
Impact Statement of United States, et al.,
United States v. Comcast Corp., (D.C.
Cir. 2011) at 11.
[25] For
example, a consumer streaming Netflix at its high quality HD rate (2.3 GB per
hour) would hit the 300 GB cap approximately 5.5 days into the month. A consumer streaming HD video at
Comcast’s assumed rate of 6,000 Kbps (2.7 GB per hour) would hit the 300 GB cap
approximately one day sooner.
[26] Comcast’s
2010 household usage estimate was 8 hours of television per day. At 2.3 GB per hour, a full OTT
replacement for high definition television would weigh in at 552 GB per month. At 2.7 GB per hour, a full OTT
replacement for high definition television would weigh in at 648 GB per month.
[27] Of course,
in the final analysis whether or not the Xfinity app on the Xbox is a
"Title VI" service does not matter. A service can be both
a broadband service and a Title VI
service. And to the extent that the Xfinity app is a Title VI service, it is subject to various Commission rules
forbidding discrimination against rival video services. See
47 U.S.C. § 548.
[28] http://xbox.comcast.net/faqs.html
[29] See Comments of Public Knowledge, Interpretation of the Terms “Multichannel
Video Programming Distributor” and “Channel” as Raised in Pending Program
Access Proceeding, MB Docket No. 12-83 (filed May 14, 2012), available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/interpretation-mvpd.
[log] =>
[revision_timestamp] => 1343832856
[format] => 7
[name] => Katy Tasker
[picture] => files/pictures/picture-3459.png
[data] => a:6:{s:7:"contact";i:0;s:15:"googleanalytics";a:1:{s:6:"custom";i:1;}s:14:"picture_delete";i:0;s:14:"picture_upload";s:0:"";s:13:"form_build_id";s:37:"form-66da78a3d68000723cc608f250b717de";s:14:"wysiwyg_status";a:1:{i:7;i:7;}}
[path] => comcast-xbox-data-caps-petition
[print_display] => 1
[print_display_comment] => 0
[print_display_urllist] => 1
[print_mail_display] => 1
[print_mail_display_comment] => 0
[print_mail_display_urllist] => 1
[print_pdf_display] => 1
[print_pdf_display_comment] => 0
[print_pdf_display_urllist] => 1
[last_comment_timestamp] => 1343832056
[last_comment_name] =>
[comment_count] => 0
[taxonomy] => Array
(
[336] => stdClass Object
(
[tid] => 336
[vid] => 5
[name] => agency filing
[description] =>
[weight] => 0
)
[124] => stdClass Object
(
[tid] => 124
[vid] => 5
[name] => Comcast
[description] =>
[weight] => 0
)
[154] => stdClass Object
(
[tid] => 154
[vid] => 5
[name] => Competition
[description] =>
[weight] => 0
)
[122] => stdClass Object
(
[tid] => 122
[vid] => 5
[name] => Data Caps
[description] =>
[weight] => 0
)
)
[files] => Array
(
[1010] => stdClass Object
(
[fid] => 1010
[uid] => 3459
[filename] => Comcast-Xbox FINAL.pdf
[filepath] => files/Comcast-Xbox FINAL.pdf
[filemime] => application/pdf
[filesize] => 200857
[status] => 1
[timestamp] => 1343831031
[origname] =>
[vid] => 7106
[description] => Comcast-Xbox Data Caps Petition to FCC
[list] => 1
[nid] => 7044
[weight] => 0
)
)
[page_title] =>
[nodewords] => Array
(
[abstract] => Array
(
[value] =>
)
[canonical] => Array
(
[value] =>
)
[copyright] => Array
(
[value] =>
)
[dc.contributor] => Array
(
[value] =>
)
[dc.creator] => Array
(
[value] =>
)
[dc.date] => Array
(
[value] => Array
(
[month] => 8
[day] => 1
[year] => 2012
)
)
[dc.title] => Array
(
[value] =>
)
[description] => Array
(
[value] =>
)
[keywords] => Array
(
[value] =>
)
[location] => Array
(
[latitude] =>
[longitude] =>
)
[pics-label] => Array
(
[value] =>
)
[revisit-after] => Array
(
[value] => 1
)
[robots] => Array
(
[value] => Array
(
[noarchive] => 0
[nofollow] => 0
[noindex] => 0
[noodp] => 0
[nosnippet] => 0
[noydir] => 0
)
[use_default] => 0
)
)
[build_mode] => 0
[readmore] => 1
[content] => Array
(
[print_links] => Array
(
[#weight] => -101
[#suffix] =>
[#value] =>
[#prefix] =>
[#title] =>
[#description] =>
[#printed] => 1
)
[field_issue] => Array
(
[#type_name] => documentfile
[#context] => full
[#field_name] => field_issue
[#post_render] => Array
(
[0] => content_field_wrapper_post_render
)
[#weight] => -1
[field] => Array
(
[#description] =>
[items] => Array
(
[#title] =>
[#description] =>
[#printed] => 1
)
[#single] => 1
[#attributes] => Array
(
)
[#required] =>
[#parents] => Array
(
)
[#tree] =>
[#context] => full
[#page] => 1
[#field_name] => field_issue
[#title] => Issues
[#access] => 1
[#label_display] => above
[#teaser] =>
[#node] => stdClass Object
*RECURSION*
[#type] => content_field
[#printed] => 1
)
[#title] =>
[#description] =>
[#printed] => 1
)
[#content_extra_fields] => Array
(
[title] => Array
(
[label] => Title
[description] => Node module form.
[weight] => -5
)
[body_field] => Array
(
[label] => Body
[description] => Node module form.
[weight] => 0
[view] => body
)
[revision_information] => Array
(
[label] => Revision information
[description] => Node module form.
[weight] => 20
)
[author] => Array
(
[label] => Authoring information
[description] => Node module form.
[weight] => 20
)
[options] => Array
(
[label] => Publishing options
[description] => Node module form.
[weight] => 25
)
[comment_settings] => Array
(
[label] => Comment settings
[description] => Comment module form.
[weight] => 30
)
[menu] => Array
(
[label] => Menu settings
[description] => Menu module form.
[weight] => -2
)
[taxonomy] => Array
(
[label] => Taxonomy
[description] => Taxonomy module form.
[weight] => -3
)
[path] => Array
(
[label] => Path settings
[description] => Path module form.
[weight] => 30
)
[attachments] => Array
(
[label] => File attachments
[description] => Upload module form.
[weight] => 30
[view] => files
)
[itunes] => Array
(
[label] => iTunes feed information
[description] => iTunes specific information.
[weight] => 0
)
[path_redirect] => Array
(
[label] => URL redirects
[description] => Path redirect module listing
[weight] => 30
)
[print] => Array
(
[label] => Printer, e-mail and PDF versions
[description] => Print module form.
[weight] => 30
)
[xmlsitemap] => Array
(
[label] => XML sitemap
[description] => XML sitemap module form
[weight] => 30
)
[nodewords] => Array
(
[label] => Meta tags
[description] => Meta tags fieldset.
[weight] => 10
)
)
[#pre_render] => Array
(
[0] => content_alter_extra_weights
)
[body] => Array
(
[#weight] => 0
[#value] => Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Applications of Comcast Corporation,
General Electric Company
and NBC Universal, Inc.
For Consent to Assign Licenses and
Transfer Control of Licenses
MB Docket No. 10-56
Petition to Enforce Merger Conditions
John Bergmayer
Jodie Griffin
Michael Weinberg
Public Knowledge
1818 N St. NW, Suite 410
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 861-0020
August 1,
2012
Table of Contents
Summary and Introduction 1
Argument 2
I. Comcast’s Treatment of its Xfinity Video App on Xbox and TiVo is Both
Discriminatory and Illegal 2
A. Comcast is Exempting its Own IP Delivered Video
Service From its Data Caps 2
B. Comcast’s Discrimination Against All Other OTT Video
Services Harms Innovation and Consumers 4
C. Comcast’s Actions Demand Enhanced Scrutiny 5
1. Leveraging Control of Internet Connections Has Long
Been a Concern of the Commission 7
2. Comcast’s Merger with NBC-Universal Elevated Those
Concerns 8
D. Comcast is in Violation of the Commission’s Merger
Conditions 9
II. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service 11
A. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service Because
It Is Only Available to Broadband Subscribers Using Broadband Devices 11
B. Title VI Services and Broadband Services are not
Mutually Exclusive 12
III. The Commission Must Establish Remedies that End Comcast’s Discrimination
and Prevent Future Harms from Comcast’s use of Data Caps 13
Conclusion 15
Summary and Introduction
Public Knowledge
requests that the Commission move to enforce the conditions it imposed upon
Comcast as part of Comcast’s merger with NBC-Universal. Comcast’s decision to exempt its online
video service from its own data caps is precisely the type of behavior
contemplated and barred by the Commission in the Merger Order. As such, the
Commission must move to end the behavior and prevent it
from being repeated in the future.
Although Comcast’s
decision may very well also be a violation of the Commission’s Open Internet
Order, it is critical for the Commission to first address this problem within
the context of the recent merger between Comcast and NBC-Universal. While the Open
Internet rules were intended as rules of general applicability for a multitude
of possibilities, the situation presented here is precisely that
envisioned by the Commission when it described the potential harms to
competition that could result from the merger. The Commission therefore has a
unique responsibility to address Comcast's conduct in the context of the merger
order, to avert the very harm the Commission accurately foresaw.
In evaluating the
merger, the Commission highlighted specific concerns associated with the
combination of the nation’s largest internet service provider and one of the
nation’s largest content companies.
These went above and beyond the more generalized problems that drove the
Open Internet Order. The behavior
highlighted in this petition is the realization of those specific concerns, and
therefore should be considered under the rules most directly related to them. Critically, no activity in this docket
would bar additional enforcement actions under the Open Internet Order.
Argument
I. Comcast’s Treatment of its Xfinity Video App on
Xbox and TiVo is Both Discriminatory and Illegal
Comcast’s
special treatment of its Xfinity video app realizes the fears the Commission expressed
regarding Comcast’s merger with NBC-Universal. As such, the Commission has an obligation to bring it to an
end.
A. Comcast is Exempting its Own IP Delivered Video
Service From its Data Caps
Consumers
have long been able to access internet video content on both their Xbox 360
game consoles and their TiVo DVRs.
Both platforms allow consumers to download and install apps for online
video services such as Netflix, YouTube, and Amazon Prime. These apps deliver video by way of the
consumer’s broadband connection and make it easy to watch internet-delivered
video on their television. In
fact, for many consumers this “over the top” (OTT) video experience is evolving
into a competitor to, and a replacement for, traditional MVPD pay television
service.[1] While the business models of these apps
vary and some require an additional subscription, they all require a broadband internet
connection in order to function.
Since
2008, Comcast has imposed a data cap of 250 GB per month on its residential
video customers.[2] As a general matter all OTT video, like
all data, has counted against a Comcast consumer’s data cap. If a consumer used more than the
allocated 250 GB per month of data for two consecutive months, that consumer
would be expelled from the network for a full year.[3] By Comcast’s own admission, the cap was
not imposed to address network congestion[4]
and was, until quite recently, below the 288 GB per month of data it projected
was needed to replace a cable television subscription with OTT offerings.[5]
Recently,
Comcast announced that it was raising its data cap to 300 GB per month.[6] Instead of being expelled from the
network a consumer who goes over the limit will be charged $10 for each
additional 50 GB.[7]
In
March of this year Comcast announced that it was bringing its own OTT video app
to the Xbox 360 and TiVo platforms.[8] This app delivers on-demand video over
IP and requires both an Xfinity broadband subscription and an Xfinity cable television subscription. The video is delivered through the
consumer’s home network to the Xbox 360 or TiVo device.
Comcast also
announced that this new Xfinity video app would not count against a consumer’s
monthly data cap. As a result, a
consumer trying to decide between a number of OTT video options on her Xbox 360
or TiVo knows that all of her choices count against her Comcast broadband data
cap – except the choice offered by Comcast.
B. Comcast’s Discrimination Against All Other OTT
Video Services Harms Innovation and Consumers
By
exempting its own OTT video service – and only its own OTT video service – from
data caps, Comcast is discriminating against every unaffiliated OTT video
service. This harms innovation and
harms consumers.
OTT
video has greatly expanded the amount and types of video content available to
consumers. Instead of squeezing
into the lineup of MVPDs, creators can connect to the public directly. This has fostered the creation of niche
programming and allowed new creators to build fan bases.
It
has also lead to the rise of innovative and competitive video
distributors. Netflix, Hulu, Dailymotion,
YouTube, Amazon, Revision 3 – all use different models to offer consumers
different types of video content over their broadband connection. These services introduce innovation
themselves and have begun to force MVPDs such as Comcast to innovate in
response.[9] Ultimately, this innovation results in
more competition, which benefits consumers.[10] Competition drives prices down while
driving quality up.
Discriminating
against non-affiliated OTT video undermines those trends. Comcast’s decision to exempt its own app
from the cap creates two kinds of OTT offerings: Comcast’s and the rest. The only reason that Comcast is able to
differentiate its OTT offering in this way is because it owns the network that
all OTT providers rely on to reach consumers. Comcast must not be allowed to leverage its control over
last mile connections to gain advantages in unrelated markets.
C. Comcast’s Actions Demand Enhanced Scrutiny
While
discrimination by any ISP raises concerns, Comcast’s unique history and
structure demand an enhanced level of scrutiny from the Commission.
Comcast
has a history of manipulating its network in a manner that directly contradicts
the principles of an open, competitive internet.[11] When confronted with accusations of
wrongdoing, Comcast has also obfuscated the true nature of its behavior.[12] In light of this, the Commission would
be wise to pay particular attention to concerns raised about Comcast’s behavior
and be wary of accepting technical justifications at face value.
In
addition to its history of problematic network management, Comcast’s current
market position demands a heightened level of scrutiny towards its behavior. As the Commission is well aware,
Comcast is a vertically integrated entertainment conglomerate. In addition to its internet access and
MVPD offerings, Comcast owns what was once NBC-Universal, thus expanding its
position in the content business.
This troika of interests gives Comcast an enhanced motivation and
ability to act contrary to the public interest. This level of control across industries can also make identifying
such behavior even more difficult.
As
the Commission has recently demonstrated by holding Comcast to its commitment
to offer standalone broadband,[13]
and as Project Concord has shown with its dispute with Comcast over programming
access,[14]
it takes some resolve to hold Comcast to the letter and spirit of its merger
commitments. But where, as here, Comcast is taking actions that not only
violate its merger conditions but threatens the growth of online video more
generally, that resolve becomes all the more necessary.
1. Leveraging Control of Internet Connections Has
Long Been a Concern of the Commission
The Commission
recognized the ability of broadband providers to act contrary to the public
interest well before the merger between Comcast and NBC-Universal. In 2004, then-Chairman Michael Powell
spoke about how Internet Freedom (including the freedom to access content)
served “as an insurance policy against the potential rise of abusive market
power by vertically integrated providers.”[15] The following year the Commission
adopted a policy statement that took a step towards formalizing those
protections.[16]
More recently, in
its Open Internet Order the Commission plainly stated that a “broadband
provider might use this power [to control the transmission of network traffic
over a broadband connection] to benefit its own or affiliated offerings at the
expense of unaffiliated offerings.”[17] Specifically, the Commission observed that
“[t]oday, broadband providers have incentives to interfere with the operations
of third-party Internet-based services that compete with the providers’ revenue-generating
telephony and/or pay television services.”[18]
Of
course, that is precisely what Comcast is doing today. Comcast is using its control over the
transmission of network traffic to disadvantage unaffiliated competitors to
Comcast’s pay television service and OTT video offering. Every video app on an Xbox 360 or TiVo
is a potential competitor (in whole or in part) to Comcast’s MVPD service. And every one of those unaffiliated
apps must contend with Comcast’s data cap. Only Comcast’s own video app is exempted from the data cap.
2. Comcast’s Merger with NBC-Universal Elevated
Those Concerns
These
general concerns were made specific during Comcast’s merger with NBC-Universal. Now, in addition to the opportunity to
leverage its control over network connections to advantage its MVPD service, a merged
Comcast/NBC-Universal has an opportunity to leverage its control over network
connections and its expanded control
over content to advantage its MVPD service.
This
ability is not merely theoretical.
After an investigation, the Commission found this threat to be real:
“[the merged entity] would also have the incentive and ability to hinder the
development of rival online video offerings and inhibit potential competition
from emerging online video distributors that could challenge Comcast’s cable
television business.”[19]
Furthermore, the Commission
determined that the merger would “increase Comcast’s incentive to discriminate
against unaffiliated content and distributors in its exercise of control over
consumers’ broadband connections.”[20]
The
Commission was not alone in concluding that the merger increased the likelihood
that Comcast would manipulate its network contrary to the public interest. During its own parallel investigation
into the merger, the Department of Justice (DOJ) recognized that internet-delivered
video – precisely the type of service that would use apps on an Xbox 360 or TiVo
to reach consumers – was “likely the best hope for additional video programming
distribution competition in Comcast’s cable franchise area.”[21] Comcast’s internal documents “consistently
portray[ed] the emergence of OVDs as a significant threat.”[22] These new entrants would give consumers
more options and also force Comcast to improve its own services.[23]
The
DOJ noted that Comcast’s position as both internet access provider and MVPD created
a motive to act against the public interest: “[b]ecause Comcast is the
country’s largest ISP, an inherent conflict exists between Comcast’s provision
of broadband service to its customers, who may use this service to view
programming provided by [online video distributors], and its desire to continue
to sell them MVPD service.”[24] As of today, Comcast has resolved that
conflict by using its control of internet access to undermine non-affiliated online
video content and distributors.
D. Comcast is in Violation of the Commission’s
Merger Conditions
Comcast’s
decision to discriminate against all nonaffiliated video apps violates
Condition G.1.a. set forth by the Commission in its Merger Order:
“Neither Comcast nor C-NBCU shall
engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, the purpose or effect of which is to hinder significantly or prevent
any MVPD or OVD from providing Video Programming online to subscribers or
customers.”
This
condition directly addresses unfair practices that significantly hinder any OVD
from providing content to subscribers or customers. That is precisely what is happening with the Xfinity
app.
Comcast’s practice
of counting all unaffiliated, but not its own, content against a customer’s
data cap significantly hinders an OVD from providing content to customers. A customer could watch Xfinity-delivered
online video 24 hours a day for an entire month and not run into a
problem. With any other online
video service, a customer could hit her cap before the end of the first week.[25] While this may be an extreme example,
it vividly illustrates how Comcast’s behavior significantly hinders the ability
of any company that is not Comcast to reach consumers.[26] Caps transform video from an all you
can eat experience to one that must be carefully monitored and limited.
Crucially,
the Condition does not require that Comcast acts with malicious intent – or any
intent at all – to be in violation.
Therefore, there is no need to make an explicit finding regarding
Comcast’s specific motivation for this policy. As long as the unfair act has the effect of hindering
distribution, that act violates the condition.
There
can be no question that exempting Xfinity video is unfair. In fact, it represents precisely the type
of behavior that the Commission has been worrying about for almost a decade. The only reason that Xfinity video is
exempted from the data cap is that it is distributed by the same company
providing the broadband internet access service used to deliver it. Even if the app were to use a slightly
different delivery path for content than other online video distributors, that
other path is only possible because Comcast also owns the delivery
infrastructure.
The
combination of the Xfinity app and the data cap exemption is precisely the type
of unfair practices that Comcast promised not to engage in as a condition of
its merger.
II. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service
If Comcast can
simply label a broadband Internet service a “cable” service and thus exempt it
from oversight, as it has tried to do here, then all of the Commission's
attempts to protect the Open Internet, promote competitive online video
service, and enhance consumer choice will be for nothing.
By Comcast's
reasoning any service it offers, provided it is made available only to cable TV
subscribers, is part of its cable offering, governed only by Title VI of the
Communications Act.[27] This cannot be the case.
A. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service
Because It Is Only Available to Broadband Subscribers Using Broadband Devices
The Xfinity app is
plainly a broadband service: it is
delivered over the same broadband connection as other internet services to internet-connected
devices, and consists of streaming video using the Internet Protocol. That said, behind-the-scenes
engineering and billing details should have no bearing on the regulatory
treatment of a service. Because
the Xfinity app appears to consumers to be a broadband video service, it is
one.
Comcast argues that
the Xfinity app is only part of its “cable” offering, governed only by Title VI
of the Communications Act, and not subject to any Internet openness
protections.[28] This argument is undermined by the fact
that Comcast requires consumers to subscribe to Comcast internet service in
order to access it, using a device which is designed to access internet
content.
From a viewer's
perspective there is no real difference between the Xfinity app and a competing
internet video app – both are simply apps that the consumer launches that
stream video over a broadband connection.
The fact that Comcast locates its servers on its own network or engages
in discriminatory billing practices does not change the basic character of its
service.
B. Title VI Services and Broadband Services are not
Mutually Exclusive
Title VI is a type
of service, and broadband is a type of delivery method. The two are not
mutually exclusive, and there is no reason why a service cannot both be a Title
VI service and a broadband service subject to the Commission’s Open Internet
rules, Comcast’s merger commitments, and related protections. Title VI is a technology-neutral
section that governs multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs),
regardless of what kind of delivery method they use. MVPDs provide a video service by various means. Analog cable systems are MVPDs. So are digital cable systems, IPTV
systems like those offered by AT&T, Verizon’s FiOS television service, and
direct broadcast satellite (DBS) systems like DirecTV and Dish. Indeed, as
Public Knowledge has argued, there is no reason an “MVPD” service cannot be
offered purely “over the top.”[29]
By contrast, a “broadband”
service is simply a service offered via broadband delivery. A broadband service might fall into any
regulatory category, such as Title II or Title VI. An MVPD service can easily
be offered via broadband delivery, and an MVPD service offered via broadband is
not somehow immune from any of the open Internet protections that apply to
broadband services generally.
III. The Commission Must Establish Remedies that End
Comcast’s Discrimination and Prevent Future Harms from Comcast’s use of Data
Caps
The Commission
must order Comcast to stop exempting only its own Xfinity video app from its
data caps. Going forward, the Commission should prohibit Comcast from
implementing discriminatory data caps again.
The Commission
could fashion this relief in several ways, ranging from prohibiting Comcast
from using unreasonably low data caps, to requiring Comcast to subject its own
services to the data caps it uses for similarly-situated services, to requiring
Comcast to let its customers choose which services will be exempt from its data
caps.
When crafting
remedies to address and prevent the competitive harms of Comcast’s
discriminatory data cap policy, the Commission should consider a set of factors
to determine whether Comcast’s data caps policy or its implementation
illegitimately harm consumers and competitors. The Commission need not necessarily
take any one factor as dispositive in a given case, although some factors may
weigh more heavily than others.
First, data cap
policies that affect one service or set of services but not others should be a
red flag to the Commission. The Commission should then look to whether the
policy has a discriminatory effect against services or companies that compete
against any of Comcast’s services. This could apply if Comcast’s data cap
policy advantages affiliated companies simply by virtue of their affiliation to
Comcast, or if Comcast and other internet service providers mutually advantage
their respective services to the detriment of services unaffiliated with any
internet service provider. The
Commission should also be wary of data cap policies that permit companies to
pay Comcast to exempt themselves from a data cap, since those policies could
have a discriminatory effect by disproportionately impacting services that are
not affiliated with Comcast.
Second, the
Commission should consider whether Comcast’s data cap is set at such a low
level that a large percentage of customers are likely to hit that cap. This
fact bears on the likelihood that Comcast’s data caps are only serving to
remove incentives for Comcast to invest in its own network and to push
customers away from services that directly or indirectly compete with Comcast’s
services for customers’ time and resources (for example, by discouraging online
video games in favor of Comcast’s paid TV services).
Third, the
Commission should consider the legitimate justifications—or lack thereof—for
Comcast’s data caps. Here, the Commission should investigate the actual impact
of Comcast’s data caps on network congestion, how often customers hit their
caps, and how often customers would hit their caps if Comcast's other services
were also subject to the data cap.
Conclusion
Comcast is
currently in violation of the Commission’s merger order and is actively
undermining video competitors. The
Commission should therefore order Comcast to immediately stop exempting only
its Xfinity service from the data caps it imposes on its customers’ activity.
Going forward, the Commission should prohibit Comcast from using unnecessarily
discriminatory data caps, as determined by the factors explained above.
Respectfully Submitted,
Public Knowledge
_______/s/_______
Michael Weinberg
Public Knowledge
1818 N St. NW
Suite 410
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 861-0020
mweinberg@publicknowledge.org
August 1, 2012
[1] Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket
No. 09-191; Broadband Industry Practices,
WC Docket No. 07-52, “Report and Order,” FCC 10-201 (Dec. 23, 1020) at 22 (Open
Internet Order); Complaint of United States, et al., United States v.
Comcast Corp., (D.C. Cir. 2011) at 5 (DOJ Complaint).
[2] Jacqui
Cheng, It’s Official: Comcast Starts
250GB bandwidth caps October 1, ars technica, Aug. 8, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/08/its-official-comcast-starts-250gb-bandwidth-caps-october-1.ars.
[3] Letter from
Public Knowledge and New America Foundation’s Open Technology Initiative to
Sharon Gillett, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau, FCC (May 6, 2011) available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/letter-to-FCC-on-ATT-Data-Caps.
[4] Letter of
Comcast Corporation, Formal Complaint of
Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, File No. EB-08-IH-1518; Broadband Industry Practices; Petition of
Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading and Internet
Application Violates the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet and
Exception for “Reasonable Network Management,” WC Docket No. 07-52, at p.
1, fn. 3, Sept. 19, 2008 (“Comcast Filing”).
[5] Notably, the
estimate of 288 GB was based on a confidential mix of standard and high
definition programming in 2010. It
therefore may significantly underestimate current needs, which include a higher
percentage of high definition video.
For example, streaming only HD video for the number of hours per month
assumed by Comcast at the bitrate assumed by Comcast would require 648 GB. Mark Israel and Michael L. Katz, “The Comcast/NBCU Transaction
and Online Video Distribution,” Submitted by Comcast Corporation, MB Docket No.
10-56 (May 4 2010) at 33,
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020448236;
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020448237.
[6] Cathy
Avgiris, Comcast to Replace Usage Cap
With Improved Data Usage Management Approaches, ComcastVoices, May 17,
2012, http://blog.comcast.com/2012/05/comcast-to-replace-usage-cap-with-improved-data-usage-management-approaches.html.
[7] Id.
[8] Major
Nelson, Comcast XFINITY TV, HBO GO and
MLB.TV now available on Xbox LIVE, Mar. 27, 2012, http://majornelson.com/2012/03/27/comcast-xfinity-tv-hbo-go-mlb-tv-now-available-on-xbox-live/;
For the first time ever XFINITY On Demand
from Comcast now available to San Francisco Bay Area TiVo and Comcast
Customers!, TiVo Blog, Apr. 9, 2012, http://blog.tivo.com/2012/04/xfinity-on-demand-from-comcast-tivo-premiere/.
[9] DOJ
Complaint at 21.
[10] See, e.g.
DOJ Complaint at 14.
[11] See, e.g.
Broadband Industry Practices, Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory
Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s Internet
Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for “Reasonable Network
Management,” Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC Docket 07-52, ¶ 32 (Aug. 20,
2008), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.pdf.
[12] See id. at 6-9.
[13] See Stacey Higginbotham, Comcast pays $800,000 to U.S. for hiding
stand-alone broadband, GigaOM, June 27, 2012, http://gigaom.com/2012/06/27/comcast-pays-800000-to-u-s-for-hiding-stand-alone-broadband/.
[14] See Ira Teinowitz, Comcast faces NBC merger complaint, TheDeal, March 8, 2012, http://www.thedeal.com/content/regulatory/comcast-faces-nbc-merger-complaint.php.
[15] Michael K.
Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Remarks at the Voice of the Net Conference (Oct. 19, 2004), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-253325A1.pdf.
[16] Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access
to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, CC Docket No. 02-33 et al., Policy Statement, (Sep. 23,
2005).
[17] Open
Internet Order at 21.
[18] Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
[19] Applications of Comcast Corporation, General
Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc. For Consent to Assign Licenses and
Transfer Control of Licensees, MB Docket No 10-56, Memorandum Opinion and
Order (Jan. 20, 2011) at 3 (FCC Merger Order).
[20] Id. at 93.
[21] DOJ
Complaint at 5.
[22] DOJ
Complaint at 14.
[23] See DOJ
Complaint 14-15.
[24] Competitive
Impact Statement of United States, et al.,
United States v. Comcast Corp., (D.C.
Cir. 2011) at 11.
[25] For
example, a consumer streaming Netflix at its high quality HD rate (2.3 GB per
hour) would hit the 300 GB cap approximately 5.5 days into the month. A consumer streaming HD video at
Comcast’s assumed rate of 6,000 Kbps (2.7 GB per hour) would hit the 300 GB cap
approximately one day sooner.
[26] Comcast’s
2010 household usage estimate was 8 hours of television per day. At 2.3 GB per hour, a full OTT
replacement for high definition television would weigh in at 552 GB per month. At 2.7 GB per hour, a full OTT
replacement for high definition television would weigh in at 648 GB per month.
[27] Of course,
in the final analysis whether or not the Xfinity app on the Xbox is a
"Title VI" service does not matter. A service can be both
a broadband service and a Title VI
service. And to the extent that the Xfinity app is a Title VI service, it is subject to various Commission rules
forbidding discrimination against rival video services. See
47 U.S.C. § 548.
[28] http://xbox.comcast.net/faqs.html
[29] See Comments of Public Knowledge, Interpretation of the Terms “Multichannel
Video Programming Distributor” and “Channel” as Raised in Pending Program
Access Proceeding, MB Docket No. 12-83 (filed May 14, 2012), available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/interpretation-mvpd.
[#title] =>
[#description] =>
[#printed] => 1
)
[files] => Array
(
[#weight] => 30
[#value] =>
[#title] =>
[#description] =>
[#printed] => 1
)
[#title] =>
[#description] =>
[#children] => Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Applications of Comcast Corporation,
General Electric Company
and NBC Universal, Inc.
For Consent to Assign Licenses and
Transfer Control of Licenses
MB Docket No. 10-56
Petition to Enforce Merger Conditions
John Bergmayer
Jodie Griffin
Michael Weinberg
Public Knowledge
1818 N St. NW, Suite 410
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 861-0020
August 1,
2012
Table of Contents
Summary and Introduction 1
Argument 2
I. Comcast’s Treatment of its Xfinity Video App on Xbox and TiVo is Both
Discriminatory and Illegal 2
A. Comcast is Exempting its Own IP Delivered Video
Service From its Data Caps 2
B. Comcast’s Discrimination Against All Other OTT Video
Services Harms Innovation and Consumers 4
C. Comcast’s Actions Demand Enhanced Scrutiny 5
1. Leveraging Control of Internet Connections Has Long
Been a Concern of the Commission 7
2. Comcast’s Merger with NBC-Universal Elevated Those
Concerns 8
D. Comcast is in Violation of the Commission’s Merger
Conditions 9
II. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service 11
A. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service Because
It Is Only Available to Broadband Subscribers Using Broadband Devices 11
B. Title VI Services and Broadband Services are not
Mutually Exclusive 12
III. The Commission Must Establish Remedies that End Comcast’s Discrimination
and Prevent Future Harms from Comcast’s use of Data Caps 13
Conclusion 15
Summary and Introduction
Public Knowledge
requests that the Commission move to enforce the conditions it imposed upon
Comcast as part of Comcast’s merger with NBC-Universal. Comcast’s decision to exempt its online
video service from its own data caps is precisely the type of behavior
contemplated and barred by the Commission in the Merger Order. As such, the
Commission must move to end the behavior and prevent it
from being repeated in the future.
Although Comcast’s
decision may very well also be a violation of the Commission’s Open Internet
Order, it is critical for the Commission to first address this problem within
the context of the recent merger between Comcast and NBC-Universal. While the Open
Internet rules were intended as rules of general applicability for a multitude
of possibilities, the situation presented here is precisely that
envisioned by the Commission when it described the potential harms to
competition that could result from the merger. The Commission therefore has a
unique responsibility to address Comcast's conduct in the context of the merger
order, to avert the very harm the Commission accurately foresaw.
In evaluating the
merger, the Commission highlighted specific concerns associated with the
combination of the nation’s largest internet service provider and one of the
nation’s largest content companies.
These went above and beyond the more generalized problems that drove the
Open Internet Order. The behavior
highlighted in this petition is the realization of those specific concerns, and
therefore should be considered under the rules most directly related to them. Critically, no activity in this docket
would bar additional enforcement actions under the Open Internet Order.
Argument
I. Comcast’s Treatment of its Xfinity Video App on
Xbox and TiVo is Both Discriminatory and Illegal
Comcast’s
special treatment of its Xfinity video app realizes the fears the Commission expressed
regarding Comcast’s merger with NBC-Universal. As such, the Commission has an obligation to bring it to an
end.
A. Comcast is Exempting its Own IP Delivered Video
Service From its Data Caps
Consumers
have long been able to access internet video content on both their Xbox 360
game consoles and their TiVo DVRs.
Both platforms allow consumers to download and install apps for online
video services such as Netflix, YouTube, and Amazon Prime. These apps deliver video by way of the
consumer’s broadband connection and make it easy to watch internet-delivered
video on their television. In
fact, for many consumers this “over the top” (OTT) video experience is evolving
into a competitor to, and a replacement for, traditional MVPD pay television
service.[1] While the business models of these apps
vary and some require an additional subscription, they all require a broadband internet
connection in order to function.
Since
2008, Comcast has imposed a data cap of 250 GB per month on its residential
video customers.[2] As a general matter all OTT video, like
all data, has counted against a Comcast consumer’s data cap. If a consumer used more than the
allocated 250 GB per month of data for two consecutive months, that consumer
would be expelled from the network for a full year.[3] By Comcast’s own admission, the cap was
not imposed to address network congestion[4]
and was, until quite recently, below the 288 GB per month of data it projected
was needed to replace a cable television subscription with OTT offerings.[5]
Recently,
Comcast announced that it was raising its data cap to 300 GB per month.[6] Instead of being expelled from the
network a consumer who goes over the limit will be charged $10 for each
additional 50 GB.[7]
In
March of this year Comcast announced that it was bringing its own OTT video app
to the Xbox 360 and TiVo platforms.[8] This app delivers on-demand video over
IP and requires both an Xfinity broadband subscription and an Xfinity cable television subscription. The video is delivered through the
consumer’s home network to the Xbox 360 or TiVo device.
Comcast also
announced that this new Xfinity video app would not count against a consumer’s
monthly data cap. As a result, a
consumer trying to decide between a number of OTT video options on her Xbox 360
or TiVo knows that all of her choices count against her Comcast broadband data
cap – except the choice offered by Comcast.
B. Comcast’s Discrimination Against All Other OTT
Video Services Harms Innovation and Consumers
By
exempting its own OTT video service – and only its own OTT video service – from
data caps, Comcast is discriminating against every unaffiliated OTT video
service. This harms innovation and
harms consumers.
OTT
video has greatly expanded the amount and types of video content available to
consumers. Instead of squeezing
into the lineup of MVPDs, creators can connect to the public directly. This has fostered the creation of niche
programming and allowed new creators to build fan bases.
It
has also lead to the rise of innovative and competitive video
distributors. Netflix, Hulu, Dailymotion,
YouTube, Amazon, Revision 3 – all use different models to offer consumers
different types of video content over their broadband connection. These services introduce innovation
themselves and have begun to force MVPDs such as Comcast to innovate in
response.[9] Ultimately, this innovation results in
more competition, which benefits consumers.[10] Competition drives prices down while
driving quality up.
Discriminating
against non-affiliated OTT video undermines those trends. Comcast’s decision to exempt its own app
from the cap creates two kinds of OTT offerings: Comcast’s and the rest. The only reason that Comcast is able to
differentiate its OTT offering in this way is because it owns the network that
all OTT providers rely on to reach consumers. Comcast must not be allowed to leverage its control over
last mile connections to gain advantages in unrelated markets.
C. Comcast’s Actions Demand Enhanced Scrutiny
While
discrimination by any ISP raises concerns, Comcast’s unique history and
structure demand an enhanced level of scrutiny from the Commission.
Comcast
has a history of manipulating its network in a manner that directly contradicts
the principles of an open, competitive internet.[11] When confronted with accusations of
wrongdoing, Comcast has also obfuscated the true nature of its behavior.[12] In light of this, the Commission would
be wise to pay particular attention to concerns raised about Comcast’s behavior
and be wary of accepting technical justifications at face value.
In
addition to its history of problematic network management, Comcast’s current
market position demands a heightened level of scrutiny towards its behavior. As the Commission is well aware,
Comcast is a vertically integrated entertainment conglomerate. In addition to its internet access and
MVPD offerings, Comcast owns what was once NBC-Universal, thus expanding its
position in the content business.
This troika of interests gives Comcast an enhanced motivation and
ability to act contrary to the public interest. This level of control across industries can also make identifying
such behavior even more difficult.
As
the Commission has recently demonstrated by holding Comcast to its commitment
to offer standalone broadband,[13]
and as Project Concord has shown with its dispute with Comcast over programming
access,[14]
it takes some resolve to hold Comcast to the letter and spirit of its merger
commitments. But where, as here, Comcast is taking actions that not only
violate its merger conditions but threatens the growth of online video more
generally, that resolve becomes all the more necessary.
1. Leveraging Control of Internet Connections Has
Long Been a Concern of the Commission
The Commission
recognized the ability of broadband providers to act contrary to the public
interest well before the merger between Comcast and NBC-Universal. In 2004, then-Chairman Michael Powell
spoke about how Internet Freedom (including the freedom to access content)
served “as an insurance policy against the potential rise of abusive market
power by vertically integrated providers.”[15] The following year the Commission
adopted a policy statement that took a step towards formalizing those
protections.[16]
More recently, in
its Open Internet Order the Commission plainly stated that a “broadband
provider might use this power [to control the transmission of network traffic
over a broadband connection] to benefit its own or affiliated offerings at the
expense of unaffiliated offerings.”[17] Specifically, the Commission observed that
“[t]oday, broadband providers have incentives to interfere with the operations
of third-party Internet-based services that compete with the providers’ revenue-generating
telephony and/or pay television services.”[18]
Of
course, that is precisely what Comcast is doing today. Comcast is using its control over the
transmission of network traffic to disadvantage unaffiliated competitors to
Comcast’s pay television service and OTT video offering. Every video app on an Xbox 360 or TiVo
is a potential competitor (in whole or in part) to Comcast’s MVPD service. And every one of those unaffiliated
apps must contend with Comcast’s data cap. Only Comcast’s own video app is exempted from the data cap.
2. Comcast’s Merger with NBC-Universal Elevated
Those Concerns
These
general concerns were made specific during Comcast’s merger with NBC-Universal. Now, in addition to the opportunity to
leverage its control over network connections to advantage its MVPD service, a merged
Comcast/NBC-Universal has an opportunity to leverage its control over network
connections and its expanded control
over content to advantage its MVPD service.
This
ability is not merely theoretical.
After an investigation, the Commission found this threat to be real:
“[the merged entity] would also have the incentive and ability to hinder the
development of rival online video offerings and inhibit potential competition
from emerging online video distributors that could challenge Comcast’s cable
television business.”[19]
Furthermore, the Commission
determined that the merger would “increase Comcast’s incentive to discriminate
against unaffiliated content and distributors in its exercise of control over
consumers’ broadband connections.”[20]
The
Commission was not alone in concluding that the merger increased the likelihood
that Comcast would manipulate its network contrary to the public interest. During its own parallel investigation
into the merger, the Department of Justice (DOJ) recognized that internet-delivered
video – precisely the type of service that would use apps on an Xbox 360 or TiVo
to reach consumers – was “likely the best hope for additional video programming
distribution competition in Comcast’s cable franchise area.”[21] Comcast’s internal documents “consistently
portray[ed] the emergence of OVDs as a significant threat.”[22] These new entrants would give consumers
more options and also force Comcast to improve its own services.[23]
The
DOJ noted that Comcast’s position as both internet access provider and MVPD created
a motive to act against the public interest: “[b]ecause Comcast is the
country’s largest ISP, an inherent conflict exists between Comcast’s provision
of broadband service to its customers, who may use this service to view
programming provided by [online video distributors], and its desire to continue
to sell them MVPD service.”[24] As of today, Comcast has resolved that
conflict by using its control of internet access to undermine non-affiliated online
video content and distributors.
D. Comcast is in Violation of the Commission’s
Merger Conditions
Comcast’s
decision to discriminate against all nonaffiliated video apps violates
Condition G.1.a. set forth by the Commission in its Merger Order:
“Neither Comcast nor C-NBCU shall
engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, the purpose or effect of which is to hinder significantly or prevent
any MVPD or OVD from providing Video Programming online to subscribers or
customers.”
This
condition directly addresses unfair practices that significantly hinder any OVD
from providing content to subscribers or customers. That is precisely what is happening with the Xfinity
app.
Comcast’s practice
of counting all unaffiliated, but not its own, content against a customer’s
data cap significantly hinders an OVD from providing content to customers. A customer could watch Xfinity-delivered
online video 24 hours a day for an entire month and not run into a
problem. With any other online
video service, a customer could hit her cap before the end of the first week.[25] While this may be an extreme example,
it vividly illustrates how Comcast’s behavior significantly hinders the ability
of any company that is not Comcast to reach consumers.[26] Caps transform video from an all you
can eat experience to one that must be carefully monitored and limited.
Crucially,
the Condition does not require that Comcast acts with malicious intent – or any
intent at all – to be in violation.
Therefore, there is no need to make an explicit finding regarding
Comcast’s specific motivation for this policy. As long as the unfair act has the effect of hindering
distribution, that act violates the condition.
There
can be no question that exempting Xfinity video is unfair. In fact, it represents precisely the type
of behavior that the Commission has been worrying about for almost a decade. The only reason that Xfinity video is
exempted from the data cap is that it is distributed by the same company
providing the broadband internet access service used to deliver it. Even if the app were to use a slightly
different delivery path for content than other online video distributors, that
other path is only possible because Comcast also owns the delivery
infrastructure.
The
combination of the Xfinity app and the data cap exemption is precisely the type
of unfair practices that Comcast promised not to engage in as a condition of
its merger.
II. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service
If Comcast can
simply label a broadband Internet service a “cable” service and thus exempt it
from oversight, as it has tried to do here, then all of the Commission's
attempts to protect the Open Internet, promote competitive online video
service, and enhance consumer choice will be for nothing.
By Comcast's
reasoning any service it offers, provided it is made available only to cable TV
subscribers, is part of its cable offering, governed only by Title VI of the
Communications Act.[27] This cannot be the case.
A. Comcast’s Xfinity App is a Broadband Service
Because It Is Only Available to Broadband Subscribers Using Broadband Devices
The Xfinity app is
plainly a broadband service: it is
delivered over the same broadband connection as other internet services to internet-connected
devices, and consists of streaming video using the Internet Protocol. That said, behind-the-scenes
engineering and billing details should have no bearing on the regulatory
treatment of a service. Because
the Xfinity app appears to consumers to be a broadband video service, it is
one.
Comcast argues that
the Xfinity app is only part of its “cable” offering, governed only by Title VI
of the Communications Act, and not subject to any Internet openness
protections.[28] This argument is undermined by the fact
that Comcast requires consumers to subscribe to Comcast internet service in
order to access it, using a device which is designed to access internet
content.
From a viewer's
perspective there is no real difference between the Xfinity app and a competing
internet video app – both are simply apps that the consumer launches that
stream video over a broadband connection.
The fact that Comcast locates its servers on its own network or engages
in discriminatory billing practices does not change the basic character of its
service.
B. Title VI Services and Broadband Services are not
Mutually Exclusive
Title VI is a type
of service, and broadband is a type of delivery method. The two are not
mutually exclusive, and there is no reason why a service cannot both be a Title
VI service and a broadband service subject to the Commission’s Open Internet
rules, Comcast’s merger commitments, and related protections. Title VI is a technology-neutral
section that governs multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs),
regardless of what kind of delivery method they use. MVPDs provide a video service by various means. Analog cable systems are MVPDs. So are digital cable systems, IPTV
systems like those offered by AT&T, Verizon’s FiOS television service, and
direct broadcast satellite (DBS) systems like DirecTV and Dish. Indeed, as
Public Knowledge has argued, there is no reason an “MVPD” service cannot be
offered purely “over the top.”[29]
By contrast, a “broadband”
service is simply a service offered via broadband delivery. A broadband service might fall into any
regulatory category, such as Title II or Title VI. An MVPD service can easily
be offered via broadband delivery, and an MVPD service offered via broadband is
not somehow immune from any of the open Internet protections that apply to
broadband services generally.
III. The Commission Must Establish Remedies that End
Comcast’s Discrimination and Prevent Future Harms from Comcast’s use of Data
Caps
The Commission
must order Comcast to stop exempting only its own Xfinity video app from its
data caps. Going forward, the Commission should prohibit Comcast from
implementing discriminatory data caps again.
The Commission
could fashion this relief in several ways, ranging from prohibiting Comcast
from using unreasonably low data caps, to requiring Comcast to subject its own
services to the data caps it uses for similarly-situated services, to requiring
Comcast to let its customers choose which services will be exempt from its data
caps.
When crafting
remedies to address and prevent the competitive harms of Comcast’s
discriminatory data cap policy, the Commission should consider a set of factors
to determine whether Comcast’s data caps policy or its implementation
illegitimately harm consumers and competitors. The Commission need not necessarily
take any one factor as dispositive in a given case, although some factors may
weigh more heavily than others.
First, data cap
policies that affect one service or set of services but not others should be a
red flag to the Commission. The Commission should then look to whether the
policy has a discriminatory effect against services or companies that compete
against any of Comcast’s services. This could apply if Comcast’s data cap
policy advantages affiliated companies simply by virtue of their affiliation to
Comcast, or if Comcast and other internet service providers mutually advantage
their respective services to the detriment of services unaffiliated with any
internet service provider. The
Commission should also be wary of data cap policies that permit companies to
pay Comcast to exempt themselves from a data cap, since those policies could
have a discriminatory effect by disproportionately impacting services that are
not affiliated with Comcast.
Second, the
Commission should consider whether Comcast’s data cap is set at such a low
level that a large percentage of customers are likely to hit that cap. This
fact bears on the likelihood that Comcast’s data caps are only serving to
remove incentives for Comcast to invest in its own network and to push
customers away from services that directly or indirectly compete with Comcast’s
services for customers’ time and resources (for example, by discouraging online
video games in favor of Comcast’s paid TV services).
Third, the
Commission should consider the legitimate justifications—or lack thereof—for
Comcast’s data caps. Here, the Commission should investigate the actual impact
of Comcast’s data caps on network congestion, how often customers hit their
caps, and how often customers would hit their caps if Comcast's other services
were also subject to the data cap.
Conclusion
Comcast is
currently in violation of the Commission’s merger order and is actively
undermining video competitors. The
Commission should therefore order Comcast to immediately stop exempting only
its Xfinity service from the data caps it imposes on its customers’ activity.
Going forward, the Commission should prohibit Comcast from using unnecessarily
discriminatory data caps, as determined by the factors explained above.
Respectfully Submitted,
Public Knowledge
_______/s/_______
Michael Weinberg
Public Knowledge
1818 N St. NW
Suite 410
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 861-0020
mweinberg@publicknowledge.org
August 1, 2012
[1] Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket
No. 09-191; Broadband Industry Practices,
WC Docket No. 07-52, “Report and Order,” FCC 10-201 (Dec. 23, 1020) at 22 (Open
Internet Order); Complaint of United States, et al., United States v.
Comcast Corp., (D.C. Cir. 2011) at 5 (DOJ Complaint).
[2] Jacqui
Cheng, It’s Official: Comcast Starts
250GB bandwidth caps October 1, ars technica, Aug. 8, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/08/its-official-comcast-starts-250gb-bandwidth-caps-october-1.ars.
[3] Letter from
Public Knowledge and New America Foundation’s Open Technology Initiative to
Sharon Gillett, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau, FCC (May 6, 2011) available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/letter-to-FCC-on-ATT-Data-Caps.
[4] Letter of
Comcast Corporation, Formal Complaint of
Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, File No. EB-08-IH-1518; Broadband Industry Practices; Petition of
Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading and Internet
Application Violates the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet and
Exception for “Reasonable Network Management,” WC Docket No. 07-52, at p.
1, fn. 3, Sept. 19, 2008 (“Comcast Filing”).
[5] Notably, the
estimate of 288 GB was based on a confidential mix of standard and high
definition programming in 2010. It
therefore may significantly underestimate current needs, which include a higher
percentage of high definition video.
For example, streaming only HD video for the number of hours per month
assumed by Comcast at the bitrate assumed by Comcast would require 648 GB. Mark Israel and Michael L. Katz, “The Comcast/NBCU Transaction
and Online Video Distribution,” Submitted by Comcast Corporation, MB Docket No.
10-56 (May 4 2010) at 33,
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020448236;
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020448237.
[6] Cathy
Avgiris, Comcast to Replace Usage Cap
With Improved Data Usage Management Approaches, ComcastVoices, May 17,
2012, http://blog.comcast.com/2012/05/comcast-to-replace-usage-cap-with-improved-data-usage-management-approaches.html.
[7] Id.
[8] Major
Nelson, Comcast XFINITY TV, HBO GO and
MLB.TV now available on Xbox LIVE, Mar. 27, 2012, http://majornelson.com/2012/03/27/comcast-xfinity-tv-hbo-go-mlb-tv-now-available-on-xbox-live/;
For the first time ever XFINITY On Demand
from Comcast now available to San Francisco Bay Area TiVo and Comcast
Customers!, TiVo Blog, Apr. 9, 2012, http://blog.tivo.com/2012/04/xfinity-on-demand-from-comcast-tivo-premiere/.
[9] DOJ
Complaint at 21.
[10] See, e.g.
DOJ Complaint at 14.
[11] See, e.g.
Broadband Industry Practices, Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory
Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s Internet
Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for “Reasonable Network
Management,” Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC Docket 07-52, ¶ 32 (Aug. 20,
2008), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.pdf.
[12] See id. at 6-9.
[13] See Stacey Higginbotham, Comcast pays $800,000 to U.S. for hiding
stand-alone broadband, GigaOM, June 27, 2012, http://gigaom.com/2012/06/27/comcast-pays-800000-to-u-s-for-hiding-stand-alone-broadband/.
[14] See Ira Teinowitz, Comcast faces NBC merger complaint, TheDeal, March 8, 2012, http://www.thedeal.com/content/regulatory/comcast-faces-nbc-merger-complaint.php.
[15] Michael K.
Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Remarks at the Voice of the Net Conference (Oct. 19, 2004), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-253325A1.pdf.
[16] Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access
to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, CC Docket No. 02-33 et al., Policy Statement, (Sep. 23,
2005).
[17] Open
Internet Order at 21.
[18] Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
[19] Applications of Comcast Corporation, General
Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc. For Consent to Assign Licenses and
Transfer Control of Licensees, MB Docket No 10-56, Memorandum Opinion and
Order (Jan. 20, 2011) at 3 (FCC Merger Order).
[20] Id. at 93.
[21] DOJ
Complaint at 5.
[22] DOJ
Complaint at 14.
[23] See DOJ
Complaint 14-15.
[24] Competitive
Impact Statement of United States, et al.,
United States v. Comcast Corp., (D.C.
Cir. 2011) at 11.
[25] For
example, a consumer streaming Netflix at its high quality HD rate (2.3 GB per
hour) would hit the 300 GB cap approximately 5.5 days into the month. A consumer streaming HD video at
Comcast’s assumed rate of 6,000 Kbps (2.7 GB per hour) would hit the 300 GB cap
approximately one day sooner.
[26] Comcast’s
2010 household usage estimate was 8 hours of television per day. At 2.3 GB per hour, a full OTT
replacement for high definition television would weigh in at 552 GB per month. At 2.7 GB per hour, a full OTT
replacement for high definition television would weigh in at 648 GB per month.
[27] Of course,
in the final analysis whether or not the Xfinity app on the Xbox is a
"Title VI" service does not matter. A service can be both
a broadband service and a Title VI
service. And to the extent that the Xfinity app is a Title VI service, it is subject to various Commission rules
forbidding discrimination against rival video services. See
47 U.S.C. § 548.
[28] http://xbox.comcast.net/faqs.html
[29] See Comments of Public Knowledge, Interpretation of the Terms “Multichannel
Video Programming Distributor” and “Channel” as Raised in Pending Program
Access Proceeding, MB Docket No. 12-83 (filed May 14, 2012), available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/interpretation-mvpd.
[#printed] => 1
)
[links] => Array
(
[print_html] => Array
(
[href] => print/7044
[title] => Printer-friendly version
[attributes] => Array
(
[title] => Display a printer-friendly version of this page.
[class] => print-page
[rel] => nofollow
)
[html] =>
[query] =>
)
)
)